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A European Destiny 
Michael Foley 
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     The Great Cauldron: A History of Southeastern Europe, by Marie-Janine Calic, trans 
Elizabeth Janik. Harvard University Press, 724 pp, €39.95, ISBN 978-0674983922 
 
     Marie-Janine Calic’s The Great Cauldron is a huge, erudite and panoramic history 
of southeastern Europe from late antiquity to the present day. Her use of the phrase, 
southeastern Europe in the title, rather than the Balkans, is an interesting and not 
merely a semantic point, as it highlights a central plank of the book. That phrase 
encapsulates an argument that says southeastern Europe is Europe – an integral part 
of Europe – that has shaped and been shaped by its history, and not some other 
place, a borderland that is only partially European. 
     The Balkans only became the Balkans from the late nineteenth century, a 
designation that brought with it connotations of otherness, non-Europe, or only sort 
of Europe. Before that much of southeastern Europe was simply “Turkey in Europe” 
or the Near East as newspapers tended to call the region. Those parts of the Balkans 
which were not part of Turkey in Europe were, of course, also ruled by imperial 
powers, either Austrian or Venetian. 
     While the people of the region acknowledge that it is often known as the Balkans, 
there is a slight distaste for the label. Balkanisation is associated with political 
fragmentation and irrational violence, a place of assassination and terror. I recall a 
taxi driver in Zagreb giving me a detailed and complex geography lesson to show 
that Croatia was not part of the Balkans, an argument predicated on the river Sava 
being the real border with the Balkans. In the end, as is the case so often in the 
region, the real separation was a religious one, Croatia was Catholic, while 
everything to the east was either Orthodox or Muslim. As the journalist and writer 
Misha Glenny wrote in his history of the Balkans since 1804: “If somebody displays a 
‘Balkan mentality’, for example, it implies a predilection for deceit, exaggeration and 
unreliability. As Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in 1989, generalisations about the 
peoples who inhabit the region, and their histories, were spread by media 
organisations that had long ago outlawed such clichés when reporting from Africa, 
the Middle East or China. The Balkans apparently enjoy a special exemption from 
the rules against stereotyping.’ 
     The people of southeastern Europe assume that everyone outside the Balkans 
views the region as a negative. Some years ago, while working in Bulgaria, I read to 
a group of university students an account of a people known for their irrational 
violence and terror, who were nearer to animals than real people. The account came 
from Punch. When I asked who was being described, the Balkans identified their 
stereotype without hesitation. No, I said, it was the Irish. They were puzzled. 
Most commentators still view the Balkans as a land of “ancient hatreds”, including 
Robert Kaplan, whose book, Balkan Ghosts, was read by President Clinton at the 
height of the War in former Yugoslavia. Kaplan’s basic argument was that the hatred 
for each other among the people of southeastern Europe was beyond any outside 
influence. Consequently, it is said, Clinton did not want to intervene in the war. 
     Other unflattering views of the Balkans include that of  Agatha Christie, who 
invented a country called Herzoslovakia. Herzoslovakia, she wrote: “Principal 
rivers, unknown. Principal mountains, also unknown, but fairly numerous. Capital, 
Ekarest. Population, chiefly brigands. Hobby, assassinating kings and having 
revolutions.” The country suffered from “periodic revolutions”. The historian 
Edward Gibbon wrote in Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire that Croatia and Bosnia 
were “still infested by tribes of barbarians. “Kosovo,” Tony Blair said in April 1999, 
“is on the doorstep of Europe”, something geographers would contest but which 
probably coincided with a popular view that the Balkans occupied a transitional 
place between well-ordered and civilised Europe and the chaos of the Orient. 
     Conversely, throughout The Great Cauldron, Calic draws attention to the 
interaction between southeastern Europe and the Western world. In 1776, the Comte 
de Choiseul-Gouffier, a future French ambassador to the Ottoman empire, visited a 
Greek Orthodox monastery on the island of Patmos and was asked by a local monk: 
“Is Voltaire still living?” In Romania, after the outbreak of the American civil war in 
1861, “boyars, soldiers, priests, intellectuals and educated ladies read the translation 
of Uncle Tom’s Cabin”, finding in the campaign to abolish slavery a model for the 
cause of social reform at home. Likewise, Jovan Skerlic, an early twentieth century 
Serbian literary theorist, wrote that the choice facing his region was “either to accept 
western culture and live, as the Japanese have done, or to oppose it and be overrun, 
as has happened to the American Indians and Australian aborigines”. 
     For much of its history the region was central to international developments and 
Calic is correct to begin her history from the earliest times, so that we understand 
southeastern Europe’s place in the Roman empire, in the great religious debates, as 
the seat of religious dualism that spread with huge consequences to medieval 
France, and of the division in the Roman empire and the Christian church into 
Catholicism based in Rome, and Orthodoxy in Byzantium. Later, of course, Islam 
was added to the mix, as was Judaism.  
     Of major importance to Calic’s thesis, that southeastern Europe was and is part of 
the European mainstream, is the Enlightenment. Unlike the Enlightenment in 
Western Europe, that in southeastern Europe was religious. Atheism, deism and 
anti-clericalism had no roots therre. The educated elite who promoted 
Enlightenment values and writing were almost exclusively clerics. It was only after 
the French Revolution that the church recognised the subversive nature of the ideas 
and their power. 
     The Enlightenment is hugely important and whether the Balkans even 
experienced it is a fundamental question, because it is the start of the modern world. 
Western historiography would claim there was never an “authentic” enlightenment 
in the Balkans and if there was an intellectual development it was rather a question 
of how Western ideas were accepted, or were not. Calic argues that the problem with 
this interpretation is that it is based on the assumption that Enlightenment was a 
uniform phenomenon that occurred within a strict time period and was defined by 
radical sceptical French philosophy. Newer research, she maintains, shows a much 
broader spectrum, with different national, regional and confessional 
“enlightenments” existing within Europe and the world. No one today doubts that 
what we call the Scottish Enlightenment was different from the French 
Enlightenment, for instance. 
     But what becomes evident is that the desire for cultural renewal and social 
progress would ultimately bring the  political order in the Balkans to the point of 
collapse. “Intellectural and cultural changes thus paved the way for the later 
revolutions of the 19th century,” Calic states. In other words, the growth of Balkan 
nationalism, the wars for independence from Ottoman Turkey, the two Balkan wars 
– which defined southeastern Europe as a place of savagery – were only possible 
because the values of the Enlightenment had been accepted, albeit in a very different 
form to that of France, for instance. But, as Calic argues, the Balkan Enlightenment, 
centred on clerical intellectuals, and national histories written by churchmen, was as 
legitimate as the French, the German or the Scottish. It was the “enlighted 
absolutism” of Catherine the Great in Russia that had a major role of spreading the 
new philosophical ideas among the Christians of the Ottoman empire. It was the 
acceptance of those Enlightenment values and what came afterwards, a growing 
awareness of nationalism, that makes the Balkans so distinctly European. 
From the Enlightenment, through the two Balkan wars to the First World War, the 
people of the region began to think of themselves as belonging to specific nations 
rather than being simply Catholic, Orthodox or Muslim, as they had been 
categorised under the Ottomans, religion as a marker of identity becoming a 
“national” phenomenon. National histories, written in the various languages of the 
region, helped to encourage this change, and as there were no obvious geographic 
and ethnic boundaries, conflict was almost inevitable. This trend was further 
encouraged by the role the great powers played as they circled each other, watching 
the void that was opening up as the power of the Ottoman empire in the Balkans 
declined. 
     In a subject this large it could be difficult to find the space for the detail, the 
stories that brings a narrative alive. Calic is good at describing life in Plovdiv, 
Dubrovnik, Zagreb, Thessaloniki or Sarajevo. She also litters her story with 
fascinating individuals, such as the Greek-born Croatian bishop Ivan Dominik 
Stratiko. After his education in Rome and Florence, he joined the Dominicans and 
taught philosophy and theology. He admired the works of Voltaire, Montesquieu 
and Rousseau. “He was able to take certain liberties because of his fame and 
popularity and his success with women astonished even the Venetian Giacomo 
Casanova,” writes Calic. 
     He was also a reformer who worked to improve the lives of the impoverished 
people of his diocese in Croatia. As well as putting in place projects to improve their 
lot, he wrote against censorship, in favour of equality of the sexes, and against the 
Austrian Archduke Leopold. There are others, including the Greek merchant and 
poet Rhigas Velestinlis, whose revolutionary pamphlet called for a general uprising 
against Ottoman tyranny as early as 1797, or Eugenios Voulgaris, the director of the 
philosophy academy on the Holy Mountain of Athos and one of the most prominent 
proponents of the Enlightenment. The monk Paisi wrote a Slavo-Bulgarian history, 
the first synthesis of Bulgarian history, in his monastery library. It was hardly a 
scholarly work, but it was in Bulgarian, a language he championed, and might be 
considered a forerunner of the Bulgarian national movement. 
     Calic is strong on how economic activity moved from the Mediterranean to the 
Atlantic and how, just as the region was achieving independence, it found itself, like 
Ireland and southern Europe, on the economic periphery. 
     Given her scholarship and expertise – as well as being an historian and 
commentator on southeastern Europe at Munich’s Ludwig Maximilians University –
she was an adviser to the Special Co-ordinator for the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe and for the UN Special Representative for the Former Yugoslavia. 
She also worked for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
at The Hague. Given that background, it is unlikely she would suggest that the 
collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent war was due to ancient 
hatreds. It was. she says, the fault of those in charge, who ordered the demise of the 
federal state, who are to blame. She opposes any deterministic explanations that 
Balkan exceptionalism brought about the end of Yugoslavia and highlights the 
agency of twentieth-century modern mass society, including its media, in the 
politicisation of differences. 
     The horrors of the war in former Yugoslavia seemed to some be a return to an 
earlier period of violence, ethnic cleansing and mass crimes, but there were now 
different international actors and it was not the nineteenth century any more. 
Following the cessation of the war much of southeastern Europe “built democratic 
systems and largely normalised their relations with one another. Today, the great 
majority of governments share a pro-European orientation.” 
Since becoming members of the EU, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania have 
moved closer to the average per capita income of Europe as a whole, she says, not 
only because of EU membership but due to the conditions of accession. While 
acknowledging the continuing issues of identities and borders she clearly sees the 
future of the Balkans within the European Union and that the entire region has 
within it the resources to allow it to achieve accession. 
     This is a monumental work, taking us from Alexander the Great to the European 
Union, using sources from almost every European language and insisting that 
history should tell the story of the Balkans in its own terms rather than through the 
lens of former imperial powers. 
     Given Calic’s analysis it is difficult to comprehend Emmanuel Macron’s current 
position of opposing the start of accession talks with North Macedonia, Albania and 
other countries in the region. Though Macron is keen to take over the leadership of 
the EU, he fails to see the centrality of the EU to so many Balkan countries, and their 
quest to be a real part of Europe. One wonders if he views the Balkans as a violent 
and irrational place full of terror and assassinations and not really part of Europe at 
all. Maybe he should find time read The Great Cauldron. 
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